Abstract
As I returned from Italy, I did not find myself isolated in Syros, as I was afraid of. Indeed, there were still many Italian patriots that had remained in this dry island . . . out of those, who had found refuge there after the failure of the 1848 revolutions. These Italians were in their greater part razor sharpers, stain cleaners, coffin decorators . . . and unexceptionally painters, masons, dance tutors and musicians. The pretentions of these artists were limited into not dying out of starvation. -Rhoides, «Ιστορία ενός σκύλου» In the passage above, the distinguished novelist Emmanuel Rhoides describes the numerous exiles of the 1848 revolutions resident in the Greek Kingdom, and especially those settled in his homeland, the port-island of Syros. Located at the center of the Aegean, Syros was then a highly prosperous merchant community thanks to its lucrative transit trade between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Not surprisingly, Syros's capital Hermoupolis, along with Athens, and Patras, another important port-city in northwestern Peloponnesus, received and remained the residences of the overwhelming majority of the defeated revolutionaries, who fleeing mostly from Italy arrived in Greece in the summer and fall of 1849.
In general, the refugees of the mid-century European revolutions have been an established category of historical analysis (Stern 1919; Wittke 1952; Reiter 1992; Csorba 2002; Lattek 2004; Tóth 2014 ). Yet, while much is known about these exiles in countries like Great Britain, the United States, France, Switzerland, and the Ottoman Empire, there are very few scholarly studies about their presence in Greece during the late 1840s and early 1850s. The article presents a closer examination of the mid-century revolutionary exiles in Greece, not only because it provides an additional study of the synchronic history of the so-called forty-eighters across Europe and beyond but also because a study of this transnational revolutionary diaspora in Greece can help integrate Greek history more fully into the wider Mediterranean and European context of the nineteenth-century revolutions and their aftermath (Isabella and Zanou 2015) .
In particular, I show that the arrival of the ex-revolutionaries in Greece provoked the first large-scale migration crisis of non-Greeks in the history of the kingdom. The careful study of the Greek humanitarian mobilization to assist the wretched refugees and alleviate their most pressing sufferings in the autumn of 1849 reveals both the nature and limits of the Greek public sphere and state apparatus.1 Furthermore, it can help reverse a standard paradigm in the history of nineteenth-century humanitarian intervention since the Greeks have commonly been examined only as the beneficiaries of European humanitarian intervention in the 1820s (Rodongo 2011, 63-90; Bew 2011; Heraclides and Dialla 2015, 105-134) . This study shall nonetheless follow a different path, shedding light on the reactions of the Greeks themselves when they were supposed to offer humanitarian aid. In the long run, I argue that the repercussions of the 1849 refugee crisis were twofold, and they shaped both the course of Greek nationalism in its relations with other Mediterranean countries and the formation of the Greek state itself.
First, the largely parallel aims and solidarity between the Greek and the Italian revolutions in the 1820s led to the formation of a "liberal international," as Maurizio Isabella and others have indicated (Isabella 2009, 82-89 ; see also Kerofilas 1919, 17-70; Noto 2013; Innes and Philp 2018; Zanou 2018) . This narrative of close transnational understanding between Greeks and Italians is further strengthened by the work of scholars like Antonis Liakos (1985) , Maria Christina Chatzijoannou (1980 Chatzijoannou ( , 1986 , Leonidas Kallivretakis (1986) , and Gilles Pecout (2004) , who highlighted key moments of the later nineteenth-century Greco-Italian political friendship. I partly revise this view demonstrating that the relations between Greeks and Italians were far from linear, and that, in fact, they went through a severe mid-century trauma. This was provoked by the hostile policies of the Greek government against the Risorgimento exiles between 1849 and 1852, policies that served both pragmatic and ideological purposes. Concurrently, the initially sympathetic Greek public was unable or unwilling to block these policies. Both state policies and popular reactions reveal, I argue, the limitations of the so-called liberal international in the mid-nineteenth century, thereby providing a more nuanced perspective on Greek-Italian relations in the period under discussion.
Second, I point out that Greece's relatively low infrastructural and financial level created novel challenges for the Greek bureaucracy; these challenges involved the exiles' accommodation and integration, as well as public hygiene and safety. This refugee-related humanitarian crisis was finally overcome only by the implementation of strict antirefugee policies that led (along with other factors that I briefly enumerate) to a significant expansion of state authority under a conservative facade. This, it can be said, was the Greek version of the "European revolution in government" after 1848, which Christopher Clark (2012) has proposed, even though Greece did not experience a mid-century revolution like those in Paris, Berlin, or Vienna (Skopetea 1987) . More precisely, according to Clark, the 1850s saw the emergence of "pragmatic, centrist governments" in Western and Central Europe, in place of the traditional leftand right-wing politics. Motivated by the revolutionary threat of 1848, these administrations set up new long-term agendas related above all to economic and infrastructural advancement. They also sought more systematic interaction with various social actors and the public sphere as a whole as a means of governance (Clark 2012, 174) . In regard to the Greek case, I reconsider the view of the Othonian regime as a premodern state, which exercised its authority mainly through patrimonial elites, showed little concern for peoples' movement and border controls, and was disinterested in investing in infrastructural projects (Kostis 2002, 51-52; Lyritzis 2008, 74-77) . In addition, I expand on Sakis Gekas's and Thomas Gallant's more general comments about the crises and state transformation during the post-1848 decade in Greece (Gekas 2013; Gallant 2015, 137) . I focus in particular on the more systematized border controls and closer surveillance that the Greek government activated against the political refugees, along with the suppression of their political activities within the kingdom between 1849 and 1852. This policy, I claim, inaugurated a modernizing trajectory in the Greek state formation, which slowly distanced it from its premodern origins and harmonized it considerably with the broader "European "revolution in government" (Clark 2012) .
In terms of sources, I rely heavily on material from the Greek foreign and interior ministries, as well as from local municipal authorities, because I want to illuminate the position of the Greek state vis-à-vis the refugees. To supplement that, I also employ a number of both progovernment and opposition newspapers to show the response of Greek civil society to the refugee question. Apart from being merely a source of information, the press can crucially help historians understand civil society's worldview and aims in its wider nationally inspired context in the years after 1821. As Pieter Judson has noticed, "printed media sources tell the historian far more about their producers than about their subjects" (2006, 182) . Fewer refugee-produced sources (memoirs, letters of gratitude, petitions to the Greek authorities) are included due to their paucity. Finally, one should not forget that the forty-eighters in Greece were always political refugees. Thus, I also turn to the great power that was most compelled to keep track of the refugees: the Habsburg Empire. Utilizing Austrian diplomatic and political police reports from Greece as a supplementary source, I delve deeper into the émigré presence in Greece.
To achieve the above aims, the following structure is adopted. Initially, I discuss the Ionian political refugees implicated in the 1848-1849 revolts on Cephalonia and who sought asylum in Greece when they failed. Then, I proceed to my argument that focuses on the arrival and early treatment of the Italian refugees by the Greek state and civil society in July and August 1849. The next section explains the gradual turn of the Greek government against the refugees from September 1849 to early 1850. The penultimate section treats the uneasy relations between the Greek authorities and the fugitives in 1850 and 1851, culminating with the purges and deportation of certain leading exiles in February 1852. In the conclusion, I attempt to evaluate the impact of foreign refugees on both the characteristics of Greek nationalism and the Greek state-formation in the nineteenth century. Greece (1833 Greece ( -1849 By the mid-nineteenth century, the presence of highly politicized foreign émi-grés in Greece was no novel phenomenon. The examination of some examples of political refugees before 1848/1849 can reveal more general patterns, according to which the Greek state behaved to such expatriates throughout the nineteenth century. The revolution of 1821 triggered a wave of philhellenism that attracted to Greece numerous enthusiastic fighters and intellectuals, mostly from Western Europe (Pizanias, 2009; Anastasopoulos et al.. 2014; Karakatsouli 2016; Mandylara and Nikolaou 2017) . The permanent establishment of a Greek state in 1830 created hopes among some European thinkers and adventurers that this supposedly model kingdom could function as a laboratory of experimentation for new social and political theories (Skopetea 1988) . Among them, a group of educated French Saint-Simonians, who were undesirable in France after the July Revolution, found a home in Greece (Moskov 1972, 151-153; Picon 2007; Isabella and Zanou 2015, 10-11) . There the ruling French party and its leader Ioannis Kolettis as well as the Bavarian regency welcomed them and used them in the organization of the young state, as at that time the Greek government was in dire need of qualified civil servants given the lack of such native personnel (Petropoulos 1968, 162-163; Dertiles 2003, vol. 1, 144-146) . The Regency anticipated that the employment of French experts would not disturb the fragile balance between the Protector Powers since France was less concerned with Greek affairs than Britain and Russia. Therefore, the French economist Arthemond Regny was installed in a high post in the ministry of finance (Maurer 1835, vol. 2, 307-315) . However, the most eminent of them were Gustave D'Eichtal, who was appointed secretary at the new bureau of political economy, and Francois Graillard, the first organizer of the Greek gendarmerie (D'Eichtal 1887; Vikelas 1893, 257-331) .
French and Ionian political fugitives in Othonian
D'Eichtal and the Saint-Simonians meant well and came up with innovative ideas, such as the creation of prototype public agricultural colonies in Greece that would be manned with European settlers, as well as the opening of Corinth canal, a plan that would be fulfilled only 60 years later (Vikelas 1893, 264-275 ). Yet their social experimentation was proven too radical, and the Bavarian elite turned against them. In September 1834, the regency charged them with "participating in secret meetings" and dismissed D'Eichtal, claiming that his "Saint-Simonian heresy did not at all agree with the principles of law and legality" (Royal Order, No. 16, 966 . Regency to interior ministry, 19 September/1 October 1834, Nafplio, Αρχείο Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών [ΑΥΕΣ], file: refugees 1834). Even if D'Eichtal was soon restored to his position thanks to the intervention of his patron, Ioannis Kolettis, King Othon's (r. 1833 Othon's (r. -1862 rise to the throne made the government take a more strongly conservative turn. This development pushed D'Eichtal to abandon Greece for Paris in spring 1835, while the rest of his French companions followed him shortly thereafter (Vikelas 1893, 279-292, 329-331) . Until the revolution of 1843, very few Frenchmen still retained public office (Poulos 1956, 259 (Hering 2004, vol. 1) . Followers of this tradition undertook initiatives that led to the promulgation of the 1844 constitution, which granted almost universal male suffrage and freedom of expression (Dimakis 1999; Alivizatos 2011, 74-106) It was also thanks to the proclamation of the Greek irredentist policy of the Great Idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα), which called for the territorial expansion of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, even though Greece did not possess the means to realize such an ambitious agenda (Skopetea 1988; Kremmydas 2010) . In spite of these practical limitations, the existence (at least on paper) of advanced liberal institutions in Greece until 1848, rendered the country an attractive destination for political refugees who fled from more conservative neighboring states.
The first group of such fugitives came from the British-controlled Ionian Islands, where foreign rule and long ties with Italy led to resemblances with what happened in Europe in 1848-1849 (Sideri 1989; Gallant 2002; Gekas 2017) . In September 1848, an uprising took place on the mostly rural island of Cephalonia due to political, national, and economic factors (Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou 1980, 65-180) . The revolt was quickly suppressed, and its leaders (George and Stavros Metaxas, Gerasimos Lazaris, and others) sought political asylum in Greece, specifically in nearby Patras. The British authorities were persuaded by this that the Cephalonian rebellion was backed by Greece. They thus began to persistently request that the refugees be removed from Patras and relocated to the Greek interior, a practice intended to weaken the refugees' ties with their homelands and to diminish the possibility of a new uprising (Seaton to Grey, 7 The Greek government at that time (October 1848-December 1849) was headed by Konstantinos Kanaris. A veteran of the 1821 struggle, Kanaris was a fervent supporter of Greek irredentism and held a naturally pro-refugee position. In spite of his intention to keep a balance among the Great Powers, he had yet to incur the hostility of both Great Britain and Russia, including their respective followers in Greece. Therefore, when multiple refugee crises erupted in 1849, the Kanaris government found itself vulnerable to international pressures, as well as attacks from the liberal opposition (Evangelidis 1893, 389-390; Economopoulou 1982, 187-191) . Having been caught in the crossfire, the cabinet acted cautiously on the Cephalonian question. On the one hand, the cabinet could hardly resist British pressure. On the other, the liberal Athenian press (reinforced by statements by the prominent refugee Stavros Metaxas) unleashed continuous charges against the supposed docility of the Greek government toward Britain concerning the refugees (Αιών, 29 March, 1, 27 April, 13 July 1849; Ελπίς, 20 June 1849; Griffith to Palmerston, 27 April 1849, Athens, TNA, FO, 32/170, fo. 337v; Wyse to Palmerston, 21 July 1849, No. 22, Athens, TNA, FO, 195/335) . In May, King Othon sought to increase his (fragile) popularity by offering an emergency credit of 15,000 drachmas from his personal fund for the Cephalonians (Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Γερουσίας 1849, 181-182) . This pro-refugee trend was further strengthened when the case was twice discussed in the parliament. Foreign Minister Dimitrios Christides was repeatedly attacked by the press and liberal parliamentarians (Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής 1849, 634-636, 678-680, 725-741; Αιών, 13, 15 July 1849; Αθηνά, 27 July 1849) until he was forced to publicly declare in late June that the refugees were free to move wherever they wished (Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής 1849, 726, 866-867), even if he reassured the British ambassador of the opposite (Wyse to Palmerston, 28 July 1849, No. 23, Athens, TNA, FO, 195/335) . Evidently, much of the public sphere supported the Cephalonians based on humanitarianism and national solidary. This Manichean approach condemned the responsible ministers for national laxity and proclaimed loudly its philanthropic feelings regarding the refugees' sufferings, while neglecting the political dilemmas at stake. Despite this fervent debate, eventually the Cephalonian question was never entirely settled.2 Its main function nonetheless was that it managed to raise awareness among Greek authorities and the public of political emigration affairs. This solidary discourse and practice seen above would soon be vital, when by mid-summer 1849 far more Italian refugees appeared to the Greek shores, creating a much more complex and massive crisis.
The early reactions of the Greek state and public to the refugees from Italy in 1849
On 11 July 1849, foreign minister Christides informed state prefects that 69 Italian military men had recently fled Ancona and arrived in Patras. The minister had ordered the prefect of Achaea to provide for them since "it was impossible for Greece to deny them asylum." The refugees were allowed to move anywhere they pleased and exercise their former professions freely. Finally, all state officials were obliged to assist the newcomers if they reached their provinces (foreign minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 14,146, 11 July 1849, Athens, Αρχείο της Ιστορικής και Εθνολογικής Εταιρίας [ΑΙΕΕ]). Soon more followed. From mid-July to mid-August, various groups totaling 212 Italians appeared not only in Patras but also in Kalamata and Missolonghi (both towns in Western Greece) as well as in the island of Spetses, close to Nafplio. According to the interior ministry, all of them were single men, most were ages 20-50 years old, the majority were employed in urban occupations such as professionals, craftsmen, laborers, and students before the revolution. The Italians claimed to have fled after the fall of the Roman Republic "due to the purges by the Austrians and French after their conquest of Bologna and because [they] were sentenced to death as apostates." The prefects and mayors were instructed to act as they had with the fugitives from Ancona, allowing residency and providing shelter (foreign minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 14,697, 18 July 1849; No. 14,786, 21 July 1849; No. 15,746, 1 August 1849; No. 16,233, 8 August 1849, No. 16,456, 12 August 1849; Athens, AIEE). The absence of any actual pressure by a foreign power against the Italian refugees at that moment meant that-contrary to the Cephalonian case-the Greek state could offer hospitality to ex-revolutionaries without diplomatic complications.
The increasing influx of forty-eighters, who by early August already exceeded 400 (Εθνική, 2 August 1849; Αιών, 28 August 1849), could not be compared with the handful of French and Cephalonian fugitives, whom Greece had previously accepted. This arrival of forty-eighters, along with the refugee-hostile agenda of the British in the Ionian Islands (Michel 1950) , called for special measures. The settlement of the refugees would have certainly surpassed the capacities of the young and poor state had civil society not provided charitable aid to cover at least the refugees' basic needs. This kind of applied transnational solidarity proves the resilience of the Mediterranean liberal international in the mid-nineteenth century. Traditional Christian philanthropy, empathy for a popular struggle for national unification against a foreign yoke, and gratitude toward the Italians (who had assisted the Greeks in the 1821 revolution) formed the main ideological references of the pro-refugee public sphere in Greece, which included not only state officials but, more crucially, social actors (Ελπίς, 14 August 1849). These trends had penetrated into a wide social and political spectrum, especially in Athens. Among the metropolitan press, these tendencies were embraced by both the influential liberal dailies Ελπίς (Hope) and Εθνική (National), as well as by the popular, pro-Russian and conservative Αιών (Century) and also, presumably, by their regular readership. This "mobilization of empathy," (Wilson and Brown 2009; see also Hunt 2008) which the Greeks demonstrated in favor of the analogous Italian cause, shows their collective ability to empathize with seemingly distant others. This concept constitutes more generally one of the main features of modern humanitarianism, and it is closely related to the notable expansion of the Greek public sphere after 1821 (Haskell 1985; Green 2014 Green , 1169 .
The citizens of Patras had spontaneously tended to the early Anconese arrivals, but these localized initiatives hardly sufficed (Αιών, 7, 18, 20 July 1849). On 5 August, leading liberal politicians and intellectuals founded a central refugee committee in Athens, which aimed to raise money and was soon expanded through local subcommittees in various smaller cities, including Patras and Syros (Εθνική, 12 August 1849; Evangelidis 1893, 400, 403; Karolides 1923 Karolides -1926 .3 Within the first days of its existence, the central committee gathered 3,000 drachmas in donations from eminent Athenians like Constantine Levidis, Ioannis Philemon, and the Mavrokordatos family (Ελπίς, 29 August 1849). Jumping on the bandwagon, Othon gave another 3,000 from his palace account, and his courtiers signed for a monthly contribution for the refugees' welfare (Chiotis 1877, vol. 2, 178 ). At a more practical level, the royal apothecary Landerer provided free medication to the refugees. His colleague Kavakos imitated him, while a barber named Grigris offered empirical remedies (Ελπίς, 20 August 1849). Beyond Athens, the local municipalities responded likewise. In late July, the city fathers of Calamata approved a refugee fund of 300 drachmas (Εθνική, 28 July 1849 Apart from the Greeks, the few Italians that resided in the kingdom since the 1820s and 1830s were keen on helping their compatriots. Many of those older émigrés had briefly returned to Italy in 1848 to fight. For them, assisting the forty-eighters meant the continuation of their common national struggle, even on foreign soil (Chatzijoannou 1991, 133-137) . Therefore, an Italian refugee committee was also formed on 22 August, along with the Greek one, and in its early days, the Italian committee managed to collect almost 1,500 drachmas (Ελπίς, 20 August 1849).4 More importantly, these Italians, who had over time become familiar with Greek affairs, functioned as mediators between the new refugees and their adopted homeland. A paradigmatic case is that of Count Alerino Palma di Cesnola. Initially a veteran of the 1821 Piemontese uprising, Palma had then moved to Greece, where he became active in local politics and served as a highly ranked judicial official (St. Clair 1972, 253-255) . By 1849, he was a respected retired judge who financially supported the refugees and brought them in touch with "the liberal opposition and the radical Athenian journalists" (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [ÖS], Haus-, Hof-und Staatsarchiv [HHStA], IB [Informationsbureau] , A-Akten, Zl.1096/1849). However, this cordial relationship between the Greek government and civil society and the forty-eighters would soon experience its limits due to the inadequate infrastructure of the kingdom. This would drastically alter Greek refugee policy.
The conservative turn of the Greek government against the refugees in late 1849
The warm welcome from the Greek government and the apparent maintenance of a romantic vision of transnational solidarity did not mean that such a liberal policy came without conditions. The relatively small size of the main Greek urban centers-Hermoupolis, for example, had roughly 17,000 inhabitants in 1856 (Bafounis [1862] 1991, ιδ), Athens around 20,000 in the 1840s (Paraskevopoulos 1907, 173-189) , and Patras approximately 15,000 in 1849 (Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως 5 August 1850)-suggested they were sensitive to large population movements. Their position was even more delicate due to the substantial domestic emigration from the nearby countryside and the subsequent rise of indigence and urban criminality that was noted from the early 1840s onward. According to the local press, the situation had become crucial in Patras, where "the beggars had lately flooded into our city" (Αχαϊκός Κήρυξ, 8 April 1841) and the " city [had] ended up the settler and asylum of foreign felons" (Μίνως, 21 December 1842).5 An equivalent influx of beggars and unemployed individuals began to appear at the same time in Athens, as well. As the capital city, Athens attracted large numbers of internal migrants. The presence of this destitute urban proletariat in the capital had raised serious sanitary and social concerns among the authorities until the late 1840s (Korasidou 1995; Vassiadis 2010) . At the same time, a cholera epidemic in 1847-1848 only increased the fragility of the Greek cities and bureaucracy to health crises and large population movements.
Such novel challenges meant that the sudden and uncoordinated arrival of numerous, armed, and war-trained ex-revolutionaries from Italy could have potentially destructive impacts on the political balance, public safety, and hygiene of the Greek cities. Despite its philanthropic sentiments, the government was well aware of this threat and sought to take timely and appropriate measures. In July 1849, the Greek consul in Malta, Phocion Roque, informed his foreign minister about the 152 Italian military men from Rome (officers and their soldiers) who had arrived requesting permission to sail for Greece; he asked for further instructions (Greek consulate in Malta to foreign minister, 13/25 July 1849, Malta, Ιστορικό και Διπλωματικό Αρχείο Υπουργείου των Εξωτερικών [ΑΥΕΞ] , file: refugees 1849). Minister Glarakis replied that the consul could accredit their passports "as long as they were issued legally and their holders had [adequate] means for a living and they did not live a swindler's life" (foreign minister to Greek consulate in Malta, 19 July 1849, Athens, AYEΞ, file: refugees 1849). Roque acted accordingly, and the Roman refugees were allowed passage. On 1 August 1849, they reached Patras, where the municipality offered them accommodation (Αιών, 6 August 1849, 2). However slight they were at this stage, such early efforts of the central state to force limitations and set preconditions upon who could enter the country would multiply in the following months.
The first actual sign of the Greek government adopting an antirefugee stance came with the circular 17,523 of 22 August 1849 (interior minister to prefect of Attica, Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, file: refugees 1849). Addressing the prefect of Attica, the interior minister discussed how the overwhelming influx of Italians, predominantly in Athens, was a disadvantage for the refugees themselves. Despite the benevolent intentions and laudable charitable activity of the Athenians, he continued, the newcomers faced gloomy accommodation and employment prospects, and their poor lodging facilities were hot beds of disease. As a result, the minister prohibited the settlement of additional Italian refugees in Athens and instructed his subordinates to encourage the refugees to head to other cities, so as to decongest the capital.
This early attempt to limit peoples' movement was mostly in vain, as the dynamics of political migration could not be tamed that easily. It seems that more refugees kept arriving in Piraeus, the port of Athens, in the coming weeks despite the prohibition. Perhaps ironically, September 1849 coincided with the maximum number of refugee arrivals from Italy. The short-lived Venetian Republic of 1848-1849 was captured by the Austrian army in late August 1849. As a result, almost 300 Venetian revolutionaries requested asylum in Patras in mid-September (interior minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 18,792, 10 September 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ; No. 19,374, 20 September 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ; No. 20,080, 30 September 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ). The steady refugee inflow resulted in constant warnings that settling in and around Athens was banned. This fact indicated that at least a substantial group of refugees with scarce means would not wish to remain in Patras but would seek accommodation in Athens, most probably due to the relatively better employment prospects there (Austrian embassy in Athens to Austrian foreign ministry, No. 70A93, 9 October 1849, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17). This domestic movement led to additional specified instructions, which were issued to the Athenian police and hygiene authorities on 13 and 16 September (interior minister to state prefects, No. 18, 782, 13 September; No. 19, 481, 16 September 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ; also interior minister to foreign minister, 13 September 1849, Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, files: refugees 1849). The interior minister underscored the need to enforce the circulars with threats of severe punishments for disobedience. Furthermore, he ordered the capital police "not to accept any [Italian] refugee willing to enter the district [of Athens] whether they are carrying passports or not." At the same time, the interior minister reprimanded the police commissioners of Patras and Nafplio, who issued domestic passports to Italian refugees heading to Athens, even if the capital was only a transit destination for them (interior minister to the prefects of Achaea and Argolis, n.d., Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, files: refugees 1849). In any case, the very appearance of successive prohibitions indicates the inability of the authorities to handle the situation. Their eagerness to issue illegal domestic passports betrays their intention to relieve their home cities, which were heavily impacted by the massive refugee arrivals.
At this stage, the limits of the Greek-Italian liberal international had started to become clear because of the pragmatic infrastructural and material limitations of the Greek bureaucracy and urban centers. This marks the origins of a grave discrepancy of opinion between the state and the public sphere concerning the refugee question since the latter still supported the exiles. The state obviously could not afford to house so many hundreds of fugitives whose arrival created turbulent social conditions (report of the Athens police to the prefect of Attica, 7 September 1849, Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, files: refugees 1849). On the other hand, upon learning of the above circulars, the press commented that Greece was still obliged to provide for the refugees despite government measures (Αιών, 24 September 1849). The representatives of the press and pro-refugee organizations sought to demonstrate their liberal and/or antigovernmental political agenda and to use the refugees for political gain. They seemed unmoved by the difficulties that the government and the state faced. Thus, in public they maintained an image of transnational solidarity, but only to serve their own purposes, which were related mostly to the internal political affairs of Greece, rather than the true concerns of the exiles themselves.
A representative example of the dissimilar approaches of the state and the public sphere is seen through the case of the consul in Malta, Roque, and his behavior toward a group of about 200 Italian refugees who in mid-September 1849 requested permission to head for Greece. The consul obeyed strictly his recent orders, granting passage only to those with valid passports. However, the captain of the vessel carrying the refugees disagreed strongly with Roque and sailed for Syros without authorized passports, even if the consul explained to him about Greece's inability to take in more refugees (Greek consulate in Malta to foreign ministry, 13/25, 18/30 September 1849, Malta, AΥΕΞ, files: refugees 1849). In Athens, the liberal Ελπίς swiftly took advantage of the situation to hurt its political opponents. It condemned Roque as "thoughtless and senseless," as someone who was on the payroll of foreign powers, as was the government on the whole. The columnist subsequently elaborated on Roque's supposed anti-Hellenic manners and his vulgar insults to the captains transporting the refugees (Ελπίς, 4, 19 September 1849) . For all its intensity, this verbal crusade was unable to solve the pragmatic dead ends of the administration or force the government to switch its rapidly unfolding policy of closed borders.
This policy kept expanding through additional limitations to the movement of refugees. This agenda was determined under the influence of the international dynamics of political migration that Greece alone could not influence.
On 20 and 30 September 1849, the Greek consul in Genova, M. Petrokokis, reported that the Sardinian government had paid for about 450 local political refugees and had leased three vessels to transport them to Greece (Greek consulate in Genova to foreign minister, 20 September 1849, No. 4; 30 September 1849, Nos. 9, 10, Genova, ΑΥΕΞ, files: refugees 1849). After 1848, it has become a common practice of various European states to banish undesirables unilaterally, sending them above all to the USA (Porter 1979, 160-161) . It seems that Piedmont chose to follow a similar strategy in this case. "The King of Sardinia had the inspiration to put in a ship and send us whatever was useless to him," Queen Amalia wrote to her father (Bouse and Bouse 2011, vol. 2, 549-550) . It seems thus that encouraged by the initial pro-refugee attitude of Greece, which has been widely communicated across the Mediterranean, Turin "disposed" their numerous participants of 1848 and outcasts following the Sardinian defeat by Austria in 1849 (Notario and Nada 1993, 289-360) . Indirect signs in favor of this view can be found in the unusually close coverage by the Turinese press of the refugee question in Greece (Concordia di Torino, 17, 31 August, 22 October, 5 November 1849). Another piece of evidence consists of the decoration of Minister Christides with the Sardinian Grand Cross in 1849 due to his philanthropic attitude toward the refugees (Chatzidimos 1877, 11). These events are more revealing of Piedmont's relief for successfully getting rid of its failed revolutionaries rather than for its ostensible altruistic empathy for Greek conditions in 1849. In any case, by autumn 1849, Greece faced a chain reaction: the previous refugee arrivals from Rome, Venice, and elsewhere were natural; that is, they had happened spontaneously right after the collapse of the revolutionary front. The last one from Genova was an artificially organized state operation, which meant that (like Piedmont) other states might in the future see Greece as an attractive exile destination for their marginal groups. In such a scenario, population influxes could be repeated and finally turned into a recurrent problem for the Greek administration with unpredictable consequences.
Despite domestic difficulties and international complications, Greece was again called to host several hundred new émigrés, this time from Genova, in September 1849. These exiles had obviously become aware of the prohibition to settle in Athens. Hence, most headed to Syros, where only a few refugees had moved at that point. Others headed to Patras, which was already full of their compatriots. In late September, 309 refugees from Genova set foot in Hermoupolis and were welcomed by the locals. The city residents were themselves mostly former refugees from Chios who had fled after the Ottomans destroyed their homeland in 1822; after coming to Hermoupolis, they built the city up from scratch (Koufodimos 2014; Delis 2015) . A generation later, they considered it natural to assist the Italians, who had gone through similar hardships. The municipal council voted to spend 4,000 drachmas to purchase food for the exiles and for their final settlement in other places. Upper-class ladies formed a charitable committee that attended to the refugees and distributed the funds mentioned above (Hermoupolis, ΓΑΚΚ, ΔΑΕ, Πρακτικά του Δημοτικού Συμβουλίου της Ερμούπολης. Συνεδριάσεις ΚΤ', ΚΕ'. 26, 30 September 1849,; Αίολος, 8 October 1849).
For the time being, the municipality aided the refugees, but it was incapable of allocating more resources for this purpose in the future. Seriously concerned, the prefect of Cyclades asked for a prohibition on the arrival of new refugees in Syros, and the government granted his request on 1 October 1849 (interior minister to prefect of Cyclades, No. 20,311, 1 October 1849, Athens, AIEE). Only a week later, however, and before the state bureaucracy caught up, the refugee numbers in Syros more than doubled with 380 additional newcomers from Genova, who, strangely enough, were allowed to stay on the island (interior minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 20,843, 9 October 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ). The Hermoupolitan authorities tried to defuse the situation by sending hundreds of refugees to Athens, Euboea, and the rest of the Cyclades (Ελπίς, 26 October 1849). Yet the plan of rationally distributing the refugees throughout the realm soon proved problematic and too expensive for the financially wracked state (Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 4C, 22 January 1850, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17). Most refugees, who moved on their own, chose to head for Athens instead of the poorer provinces. The interior ministry disapproved of this and reminded the refugees that the settlement prohibition still applied to the capital (foreign minister to [interior minister], No. 4,217, 10(?) October 1849, Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, file: refugees 1849; interior minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 21,487, 15 October 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ). The refugee overpopulation led to a dead end in Syros, where the lodging facilities that were provided were proven largely inadequate (Αίολος, 16 October 1949) . The other cities did not fare much better. In early October, one final group of 167 Italians reached Patras, where the police became alarmed by the multitude of "needy and idle" refugees wandering the city. To make matters worse, the first deaths of refugees caused by their wretched conditions were reported in the local press (Αιών, 29 October 1849; Μίνως, 24 October 1849; Αχαϊκός Κήρυξ, 26 October 1849). To end this frantic condition, the authorities forbade any future settlement of foreign refugees in Patras, thus completing their exclusion from all major Greek cities (interior minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 20,569, 5 October 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ).
The fugitives from Genova were the last substantial group of European revolutionaries to arrive in Greece. Their overall number is uncertain, which allows for speculation. All circulars from July to October suggest that there were 1,109 political refugees from the Italian revolutions and wars of 1848-1849. However, the steady enactment of state regulations suggests that several more kept entering the country illegally, thus raising their actual number. In October 1849, the Austrian embassy in Athens calculated a total of 1,500 to 2,000 refugees, most of whom lived quite miserably (Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 71, 23 October 1849, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17). The famous radical intellectual Cristina di Belgiojoso recorded 1,700 "starving refugees" in January 1850 (Chatzijoannou 1986, 141) , whereas the sympathetic historian Kostas Kerofilas (1919, 36) claimed there were more than 2,000. The gathering of such an armed crowd in the largest cities of the kingdom, whose military forces hardly exceeded 6,000 men (Veremis 1997, 12-49) shocked the Greek government. Feeling threatened, the Kanaris administration moved further away from the ideals of the liberal international and hardened its restrictive measures, both domestically and externally, against the Risorgimento fighters. These essentially defensive measures benefited the monopolization of legitimate violence by the Greek state, as well as the stricter policing of its borders and thus advanced the state formation project that had begun in the 1830s.
At the domestic level, the interior minister turned to Patras, where the refugee problem appeared more intense. In early October 1849, he admonished the local police for having allowed the Italian refugees to enter the city with their weapons and gave detailed orders to the prefect of Achaea to disarm them, even through the use of force, if necessary (interior minister to the prefect of Achaea and Ilia, No. 20, 862, 8 October 1849, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ). The Patras police proceeded, confiscating and cataloguing the weaponry. Although the measure met with the bitterness from the refugees, the process was completed without violent incidents (Αιών, 28 September, 19 October 1849) . This state initiative to limit arm usage was part of a long effort to control violence from below, mostly because of the widespread banditry throughout Greece.6 Othon's governments showed relatively poor results in fully suppressing these bandits in the countryside. Yet, as the above case demonstrated, they clearly progressed in matters of monopolizing the use of force in the cities (suggestively, No. 10,000, 18 June 1851, Athens, ΓΑΚ, Αν.Ο. file: 1214, Περί καταδιώξεως της ληστείας).
At an external level, on 3 October foreign minister Glarakis addressed all the Greek embassies and consulates abroad. He first underscored the sacrifices that the Greek state and citizens had made on behalf of the refugees. Yet, he continued, far too many refugees in Greece lived on charity, and the native job market could not absorb them either. Consequently, the minister rigidly refused to issue incoming passports to new political refugees under any circumstances, thus blocking their entrance into Greece altogether (foreign minister to Greek embassies and consulates, Νο. 4,618, 3 October 1849, Athens, ΑΥΕΞ, file: refugees 1849). At the same time, the state prefects were notified, as well (ΓΑΚ, Αν.Ο. file 405: Αστυνομία Ξένων). Soon various consuls in Italian and Ottoman cities, whose strong refugee population might wish to enter Greece, informed Athens that they would obey the new orders. Some of them added that they had already declined refugee petitions for new passports (Greek consulates in Trieste, Toscana, Adrianopolis, Crete to foreign minister, [976] [977] [978] 444, [148] [149] 36, 1/13 20, 22, 28 October, 1 November 1849, Trieste, Livorno, Adrianopolis, Chania, ΑΥΕΞ, file: refugees 1849).
The new policy started to bear fruits slowly, and after the general pacification of Europe after 1849, refugee arrivals in Greece decreased sharply. One example will suffice to show the radical turn of Greek policy. In January 1850, a ship carrying Neapolitan fugitives without passports from Malta approached Syros asking to disembark them. After reporting to the interior ministry, the prefecture of Cyclades, and the local police, the government refused to allow the refugees to land and instructed their captain to leave the country. The captain agreed and changed his final destination to the Ottoman Empire. The port authority of Hermoupolis was further commanded to treat likewise all the political refugees that might arrive in the future (prefecture of Cyclades to interior ministry, No. 199, 12 January 1850, No. 576, 5 February 1850, Hermoupolis, ΑΥΕΞ, file: refugees 1850; Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 4C, 22 January 1850, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17). Such incidents, which illustrate the reversal of the Greek policy, must have been unofficially communicated across the Mediterranean. This information soon helped to curtail the waves of refugee arrivals because those exiles who might have wanted to sail to Greece now understood that they would not find there the land of freedom they desired.
The same sense of disillusionment was strengthened because the antirefugee measures were maintained and even expanded in the coming months to include Boeotia and Corinthia in the prohibition, as well (interior minister to state prefects and to Athens police, No. 790, 21 January 1850; No. 94/15,565, 4 September 1850, Athens, ΑΙΕΕ) . It was also the apparent indifference of the Greek public sphere that finally diminished the hopes of those aspiring to a new life in Greece. No news regarding the forty-eighters appeared regularly in newspaper columns after October 1849. This proves that the fascination of the Greeks with the Italian patriots was rather ephemeral. Evidently, the Greek political forces that had rallied behind the refugee cause in the previous months did so to serve their own short-term ends. The cabinet received no serious criticism for its (to some) oppressive treatment of the foreigners. These tendencies are characteristic of the limits of the mid-nineteenth-century liberal international. This means that such a transnational patriotism could fit well among certain intellectuals and romantic fighters (see Triantafyllou 1968) . Its influence remained, though relatively superficially across broader political and social groups, who were probably eager to instrumentalize it and then abandon it when it no longer aligned with their true interests.
This reversal of the Greek refugee policy should not surprise. It was caused by the clash between humanitarian inclinations shared by broad sections of the Greek public (both liberal and conservative), on the one hand, and the pragmatic capacities and choices of the Greek government, on the other. Nonetheless, it should be strongly emphasized that this conservative withdrawal characterized a wide array of European states in the aftermath of 1848 and constituted a by no means Greek peculiarity. John Torpey (2000, 75-78) may be right pointing out that several Western European states relaxed their border controls in order to relieve themselves and offer a discreet exit to various political dissidents and other outcasts after 1848 (as Piedmont did in the above noted case). However, what happened in Greece in 1849 is more similar to the wider Eastern European experience of that time. States like the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Romania, or Serbia retained strict border controls at least up to the 1860s so as to limit the entry of potentially subversive elements in their territory and save their state from the need to provide for new waves of fugitives (Fahrmeir 2001; more generally, Fahrmeir, 2000, 27-43) . Therefore, conventional narratives based solely on the alleged ultraconservatism of Othon to interpret his refugee agenda are misleading. On the contrary, it should be highlighted that the measures the king and his ministers enforced only imitated common contemporary state norms and practices shared by many European rulers so as to tame an increased transnational political mobility after 1848.
State building and the revolutionary refugees in Greece (1850-1852)
On 12 December 1849, King Othon dismissed the Kanaris government and replaced it with one led by admiral Antonios Kriezis (Evangelidis 1893, 390-391; Aspreas 1930, vol. 1, 220, 227-228) . According to the Austrian ambassador, Friedrich von Ingelheim, the Kriezis ministry (1849-1854) was manned by energetic statesmen who-with Othon's help-were keen in limiting the supposed radical political danger the refugees represented (Austrian embassy XVI, 18) . Motivated less by pragmatic needs, as they were in 1849, and more by ideological premises, this conservative government tightened the dragnet around the refugees in Greece by increasing police supervision over their daily activities and monitoring their movement more closely. These actions violated the principles of the liberal international and extended state authority vis-à-vis political dissidents, both foreign and native, to an unprecedented level. They thus resembled the conservative administrative revolution that Europe experienced at that time, too.
This policy also resulted from developments among the refugees themselves and their partial politicization within the Greek context, at least in the eyes of the authorities. During their early months in Greece, the exiles were more interested in securing a livelihood than being politically active. Besides, the exiles' national and socialist ideals meant little to the primarily agrarian Greek populace (Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 9C, 19 February 1850, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17). Gradually, however, this changed at least partially. Grateful for the asylum that they were granted, the refugees began to adjust to their new homeland and integrated more within Greek society. Lieutenant Rigioti, head of the 69 Italians of Ancona, publicly thanked the people of Patras on 26 July 1849 (Ελπίς, 26 July 1849) and requested that he and his men be accepted into the Greek army, albeit without success (Αιών, 7 July 1849). Thinking likewise, the Italians of Athens proposed to donate copies of their most important classical literary works to the National Library (Kerofilas 1919, 44) .
Later in 1849, Venetian refugee Marco Antonio Canini proposed the creation of an Italian agricultural colony in Isthmus (near Corinth) and the opening of the Corinth canal. Employing other Italians from Patras, Canini then tried to attract investors to carry out the work. The government responded with interest, but the ambitious plan did not proceed due to lack of funds (Αιών, 4, 14 September 1849; Canini 1868, 76-77) . Despite this setback, the state did temporarily employ refugees as laborers in road-construction operations in Attica (Vournas 1976 (Vournas -1983 , while, as Rhoides showed (1978, 384) , artists, artisans, and language teachers entered the Greek market. A considerable number of refugees even applied for Greek citizenship, indicating their wish to build their lives there (Patras police to prefect of Achaea, No. 245/158, 20 February 1852, Patras, AYEΣ, file: refugees 1852). Concerning individual relations, the anthropologist Edoardo Fusco regularly exchanged letters with the Italian-born poet Georgios Zalokostas and composed poems with philhellenic content (Fusco 1880, vol. 1, 10-27) . He also got in touch with the distinguished Rigopoulos family of Patras, who had also become interlocutors and patrons of other refugees, such as the Anconese Livio Zambeccari (prefect of Achaea to interior minister, 8 October 1851, Patras, ΑΥΕΣ, file: refugees 1851; Bakounakis 2008, 122-124) .
Soon, however, the authorities began to suspect that the refugees were undertaking political activity, too. The fact that the leaders of the émigré communities in Greece had an active revolutionary past contributed to this impression. The Italians in Athens gathered around Andrea Meneghini and Girolamo Testa, both lawyers and activists from Padova, as well as Princess Belgiojoso from Milan, and Livio Mariani and Federico Torre, both former officials of the Roman Republic The most visible elements of refugee politization and communal organization emerged in Syros and Athens (hence the activity of Austrian agents there). In Hermoupolis, where the Austrian consul Nizzoli, a former carbonaro, fervently persecuted the refugees, insisted on celebrating Garibaldi, and hanged symbolically two fake figures of a Jesuit monk and the Austrian field marshal Radetzky (Rhoides 1978, 386) . When the Italian philhellene Alerino Palma passed away in Syros in January 1851, his funeral turned into a political affair. Canini, who delivered Palma's eulogy, described the hardships of the Italians and openly charged Nizzoli (who was present) with betraying their national cause (Αίολος, 20 February 1851; Canini 1868, 101-103) .
In Athens, the refugees took more systematic actions. On 3 November 1850, the Italian émigrés gathered at the city's cemetery to pray and pay tribute to their compatriots, who had perished in exile. Communal notables like Mariani and Fusco made patriotic speeches and thanked the Greeks for their hospitality. On this occasion, Francesco Gherardi-Dragomani, a veteran of both the Italian and the Greek revolutions of 1821 who had fought again in 1848, proposed the establishment of an association of mutual assistance called Societé de misericorde et de secours mutuels. The plan came into being, and the association, which aimed at the moral and material support of the exiled Italians, was formed and started holding weekly meetings (Courrier d'Athenes, 28 November 1850, 2; Pieri 1854, 631-632) . Although its essential purposes were humanitarian, political discussions must have taken place at these meetings, an adequate reason to alarm both the Greek and the Austrian authorities. Ingelheim, who closely watched the developments, complained to the Greek interior minister for having allegedly allowed the exiles to be politically associated (HHStA, PA, XVI, 17, No. 49A-C, 3 December 1850) .
Such initiatives on behalf of the Italians must have caused discomfort to the Greek government. The Kriezis ministry was brought to an even more difficult position, not only because of the refugees' supposed political endeavors but also due to the apparently plentiful instances of their disobeying Greek law and frequent criminal activity. Already by early January 1850, the interior minister ordered the prefect of Achaea to warn the refugees in Patras not to violate the laws of a country that had so generously granted them asylum, or they would be prosecuted as common criminals (interior Acknowledging its problematic relations with the refugees, the government tried to get rid of them by encouraging them to move elsewhere, even offering to covering their travel expenses. Judging from the large number of reimbursement petitions mailed to the interior ministry until 1852, this plan seemed to bear fruit, albeit the exact number of refugees who departed remains unknown (see, for example, August Döring, 9 June 1851, Athens; Gerasimos Laferos(?), 21 January 1851, Patras; Giorgio Sacca, 27 February 1851, Patras, ΑΥΕΣ, file: refugees 1851). "Their number is decreasing every day," remarked the Austrian ambassador in August 1850, "and among the few that still remain, the poor try to sail [away] via pitiful service, and those better off behave quietly" (Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 34, 10C, 11.13, 26 February, 5 March, 6 August 1850, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 17) . The indigent revolutionaries were thus eager to leave Greece and, in most cases, search for a better future in the Ottoman Empire. This numerical decline also meant that the political position of the refugees was weakened, which enabled the government to finally act against them, a development that happened in early 1852.
On 8 Fumagalli's case was not isolated but part of a broader state operation to deport those forty-eighters who were deemed a threat to the regime. What prompted the operation was the discovery that a group of Polish exiles in Athens led by General Alexander Milbitz were organizing a coup to dethrone Othon and establish a Balkan republican federation (Vlachogiannis 1907, vol. 2, 445-447) . Milbitz, a Polish aristocrat who took part in the revolution of 1849 in Rome, had settled in Athens, where he cultivated relations with Athenian politicians and officers (Kordatos 1955 (Kordatos -1960 . There was no serious indication, however, that he was involved in Greek politics. Regardless, the police broke into his house on 1 February, seized supposedly incriminating documents, and arrested him, along with 13 other Poles (Αθηνά, 1 February; Ελπίς, 1 February; Αιών, 2 February; Συνταγματική, 2 February 1852). Repeating popular but naive views, the interior minister claimed in the parliament on 6 and 12 February that the Poles were agents of a pan-European radical party, whose goal was to spread radical ideas in the Orient-and, therefore, their deportation was in order (Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής, 1852, 452-455, 479-493) .
The deportation of the Poles was carried out on 5 February (prefect of Cyclades to interior minister, No. 486, 6 February 1852, Hermoupolis, ΑΥΕΣ; Athens police to interior ministry, No. 537, 7 February 1852, Athens, ΑΥΕΣ; Αθηνά, 5 February; Αιών, 7 February 1852). However, the case against them was dubious at best. It was rumored that Milbitz had been framed. In addition, the opposition press pointed out that the Poles, who posed no serious threat to the monarchy, were sentenced without a fair trial (Αιών, 7 February; Εφημερίς της Ανατολής, 23 February 1852) . The deportations of foreign revolutionaries continued and expanded to individuals who were not related to the Poles-proof that this policy was predetermined and designed to enable the government to expel refugees (Εφημερίς Achaea, No. 4,032, 16, 19 February 1852 , ΑΥΕΣ, file: refugees 1852 Ελπίς, 8 March 1852) . His complaints to his patroness and well-known socialite of Patras Theoni Drakopoulou and his bitterness that he was now persecuted by the same country for which he had fought in the siege of Messologhi in 1826 remained unaddressed (Triantafyllou 1969 (Triantafyllou -1970 This sequence of events transpired at a dizzying speed: The arrests and deportations were executed in less than a month. The Austrian ambassador reported that in the end 36 foreign émigrés were deported. The energy the government had shown in planning and executing these operations won the ambassador's praise. Ingelheim also noted that the Greek press and opposition stood by as the refugees were being abused and deported (Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 7, 2 March 1852, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 18). A handful of prorefugee newspaper articles were the only voices against the government. It appeared that the government that had welcomed them in 1849 was now positioned against them, and the civil society seemed equally disinterested in protecting them, too, something that proves the public sphere's opportunistic motivation, as suggested above.
The rift between the Western European revolutionary ideas and at least a part of the (previously sympathetic to the exiles) public sphere become more intense after the abortive Mazzinian uprising of February 1853 in Milan, when the exiled Italian liberal leader called the Greeks to aid his revolutionary movement (The Times, 18 February 1853). Shortly thereafter, the conservative and pro-Orthodox newspaper Αιών replied that the Greeks had nothing to do with insurgents like Mazzini, who challenged the so-called Concert of Europe. The Greeks did have irredentist aspirations, the paper continued, but these would be fulfilled only thanks to the agreeable mediation of the Great Powers (especially Russia) and not through the agency of reckless and godless rebels, who, as recent events had shown, had few chances of success, after all (Αιών, 4 March 1853; Austrian ambassador in Athens to foreign minister, No. 3,865, 18 March 1853 , ÖS, HHStA, IB, AHP, 28.2 [Athen, 1853 ). At the same time, the liberal press (Αθηνά, Ελπίς) kept silent over Mazzini's call, thus revealing the differences in the aims of Western European revolutionary movements and those of Greek irredentism.
In matters of the state machinery, the deportation of the émigrés was an episode in a much larger process of neutralizing the government's domestic foes. Having noticed meaningful conservative turns in Europe in late 1851 (18th Brumaire of Napoleon III; Silvesterpatent of Franz Joseph), Othon, who at the time corresponded both with the Habsburg Court and with Napoleon III, decided to act aggressively (Dakin 1972, 133 ; Austrian embassy in Athens to foreign ministry, No. 3B, 3 February 1852, Athens, HHStA, PA, XVI, 18).
From February to June 1852, the king and his ministers deported left-wing exiles, imprisoned Giannis Makriyiannis (a respected hero of 1821 and the 1843 revolution), arrested the leaders of the ultraconservative Philorthodox Society, and brutally suppressed the agrarian revolt of Papoulakos in the southern Peloponnese. This notably intense sequence of events seems far from coincidental. It illustrates the organized effort of the central state to eliminate all competing decision-making centers and opposition forces from its realm. The closer surveillance techniques of 1850-1851 and the lightning arrests of the émigrés portray the increased will and capacity of the state to force its authority in the urban milieu. In the countryside, banditry might have stayed endemic, but the suppression of Papoulakos signaled the pacification of the land against large-scale agrarian riots (Aroni-Tsichli 1989) . Moreover, the preservation of tight border controls at least until Othon's fall (1862) also indicate the expanded bureaucratic control that Greece experienced after 1849.7 Only partial success was noted at this level, however, since the Greco-Ottoman frontier in Thessaly remained ill-policed and porous. Yet the successful limitation of the refugee influx from the sea suggests that Athens did intend and, to a degree, managed to consolidate efficient state border controls, a reality largely nonexistent in the pre-Bavarian years. The introduction of additional reforms by the "occupation ministry" (1854-1857) during the Crimean War (for example, infrastructural investments, attempt to balance the budget) complete the picture of the 1850s as a modernizing phase of Greek public administration (Kostis 2013, 267-269) . All of the above changes are also central characteristics of the revolution in government after 1848, as Clark has described it, and they highlight that Greece shared, at least to an extent, this pan-European trend, too.
After the deportation of the Polish and Italian refugees, it appears that the number of the forty-eighters in Greece diminished significantly. The émigré communities must have weakened gradually through slow emigration to the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere. No massive exodus of refugees was recorded. Judging from the wider European experience, most revolutionaries must have returned to their original homelands by the 1860s (Moulias 2007, 67-72; Tóth 2014, 214-255; ) . Scattered groups probably stayed, however, and among them, at least some followed distinguished careers. These included Vincenzo Lanza, professor of fine arts at the Athens Polytechnic School (Kalligas 1984, 81) , Innocenzo Romagnoli, mayor of Aigio (1854-1866), a vibrant town in the northern Peloponnese (Karafotia 2011) , and, quite possibly, Pietro Sambo, architect of the municipal theater of Hermoupolis (Hermoupolis, ΓΑΚΚ, ΔΑΕ Πρακτικά του Δημοτικού Συμβουλίου της Ερμούπολης. Συνεδρίαση ΙΣΤ'. 9 November 1859). Nevertheless, these fully integrated individuals could not preserve the values and communal organization of the forty-eighters, and so remembrance of the exiled revolutionaries in Greece faded.
Conclusion
Despite its relatively short duration, the emigration and presence of the political refugees of 1848-1849 in Greece is telling regarding both the deeper nature of Greek nationalism in a transnational, Mediterranean context and the capacities and priorities of the Greek state. The multitude of Italian philhellenes who fought for the Greek cause in the 1820s, in 1866-1867, or in 1897 do reveal resilient bonds of political solidarity between the two peoples. Yet, when the Greeks were called to aid the hapless revolutionaries of 1848, their response was only partially positive. The seemingly warm welcome by the Greek public was rather short-lived, ill-founded, and also unable to prevent the harsh measures of the Greek state against the refugees. Even if the actions Athens took against the movement were dictated by the impoverished condition of postrevolutionary Greece, the purges against notable émigrés in 1852 had purely political motivations. These underline the superficiality of the Greek-Italian liberal international from the Greek perspective in the mid-century. The Greeks embraced foreign volunteers from the 1820s onward, as long as the latter were useful for the Greek nationalist aspirations, but the Philhellene refugees found little longterm support when they needed it in 1849. This stance between indifference and hostility vis-à-vis the refugees seemed to be aligned, paradoxically, with the counterrevolutionary agenda of the Habsburg Empire, which maintained an active police interest in the refugees. However, there is no proof that the Greek and the Austrian governments ever cooperated against these political dissidents.
In any case, the Othonian regime remained conservative despite the 1843 constitution, its ambitious irredentism, and even its ephemeral pro-refugee proclamations. When the exiles seemed to pose a threat, Othon did not hesitate to use the state against them. At the same time, the tighter border controls and police surveillance in Greece against the refugees show the progress that the Bavarian-structured administration had made by 1852; such policies would have been unthinkable 20 years earlier. This progress should not be considered self-evident. On the other hand, it would certainly be misleading (and anachronistic) to imagine mid-nineteenth-century Greece in terms of a Weberian bureaucracy. State expansion due to the so-called refugee crisis of 1849-1852 pinpoints some early steps toward this bureaucratic modernization that developed fully only by the twentieth century. One might doubt the radicalness of the Othonian measures of 1849-1852, as well as the extent to which they can be connected to the broader European revolution in government after 1848. These measures bear witness, notwithstanding, that the Greek state persistently pursued such a long-term agenda, even if it was limited by its chronic financial and structural shortcomings.
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE NOTES

